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ENDING THE NONSENSE: THE IN PAR[ DELICTO
DOCTRINE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT
IS § 541 PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE
Jeffrey Davis*
The recent wave of disregard for corporate fiduciary
responsibilities has provided numerous opportunities for courts to
consider whether the corporations bankrupted by the unlawful acts
of their principals should be prohibited by the in pari delicto doctrine
from pursuing liability claims against third parties who contributed
to the harm. In an array of recent cases, courts have reluctantly and
apologetically, yet uniformly, permitted third parties who
contributed to the demise of these corporations to escape liability
because they felt § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code")' left
them no other choice.2
Section 541 provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
creates an estate. With certain exceptions not relevant here, the
estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case."3 Ignoring
dissenting cries for good sense and fidelity to bankruptcy policy, the
majorities in these cases have felt bound by this language to treat
the bankruptcy estate as though it were an individual seeking to
recover under state law from someone with whom it had been in
cahoots. In this Article, I argue that § 541 makes no such demand,
and these courts have missed the point. The focus should be not on
the state law rights of the debtor on the date of bankruptcy, but on
* Gerald A. Sohn Research Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin
College of Law. The author would like to thank the following for their comments on early
drafts: Professor James J. White, Honorable Marilyn Shea-Stonum, Paul Singerman, John
Olson, and Charles Lichtman.
I 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Throughout this Article, the terms "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code" refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330).
2 See, e.g., infra note 15.
3 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1).
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the property of the estate on that date-a very different matter.
Properly conceived, that property should include claims against
third parties who have participated in harming the estate, and the in
pari delicto defense should be irrelevant.
Part I of this Article describes the ancient in pan delicto defense
and explains why its application in bankruptcy cases undermines
bankruptcy policy. Part II examines the recent circuit court cases.
Part III then discusses what is meant by "property of the estate" in
§ 541, and Part IV concludes with a discussion of how these cases
should properly be analyzed. It is my thesis that in many, if not
most, instances federal policy requires direct inquiry into the merits
of the debtor's claim against third parties without regard to the in
pai delicto doctrine.
I.

THE INPARIDELICTO DOCTRINE AND ITS POLICYIMPLICATIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY

The Latin phrase in pai delicto refers to a plaintiff's
participation in the same wrongdoing as the defendant. The entire
phrase in pari delicto potior est conditio defendantis translates literally to
mean, "[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault... the position of the
[defending] party.., is the better one."' The doctrine is premised
on the equitable principle that no court will lend its aid to one who
bases a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.i Where the
plaintiff has acted wrongfully through an agent in the scope of the
agency, the usual presumption is the wrongful act of the agent is
attributed to the principal. 6 However, where the agent, in his or her
own interest, acts adversely to the interests of the principal, such
acts are so incompatible that they destroy the agency, and the
defense based on those acts is then no longer available to the
defendant.7 This is known as the adverse interest exception to the
in pari delicto rule.8 Where, however, the persons dominating or
controlling the principal orchestrate the unlawful conduct, so that
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (citing
BLACK'sLAwDICnONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)).
Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Secs., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997).
6 Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997).
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc., v. Coopers & Lybrand,
LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2003).
a In re Mediators,Inc., 105 F.3d at 827.
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the party who could have put an end to the conduct is the agent
itself in its capacity as principal, the adverse interest exception is
negated. 9 This is known as the "sole actor" rule, which operates as
an exception to the adverse interest exception.'0
When a corporation or partnership enters bankruptcy, an
estate is created apart from the debtor itself and apart from the
agents who previously acted on the debtor's behalf." The debtor is
then represented by a wholly distinct legal entity, the bankruptcy
trustee or the debtor-in-possession. 2
The job of this new
representative is to gather up the property of the estate and apply it
to the best interests of the creditors of the debtor. In such a case,
the personal conduct of the debtor's erstwhile agents should no
longer serve to shield from liability persons who have done harm to
the debtor. In Scholes v. Lehman, a receivership case arising out of a
Ponzi scheme, Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit clearly
and colorfully explained why in such instances the normal rule
should no longer be applicable:
[T]he reason [for the in pai delicto defense], of course, is that the
wrongdoer must not be allowed to profit from his wrong by
recovering property that he had parted with in order to thwart his
creditors. That reason falls out now that the [scheme operator] has
been ousted from control of and beneficial interest in the
The appointment of the receiver removed the
corporations.
wrongdoer from the scene. The corporations were no more [the
scheme operator's] evil zombies. Freed from his spell they became
entitled to the return of the moneys-for the benefit not of [the
scheme operator] but of innocent investors-that [the scheme
operator] had made the corporations divert to unauthorized

Color Tile, 322 F.3d at 165.
o Id.
9

S11U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
If the debtor files a chapter 7 petition, §§ 701 and 702 provide for the appointment or
election of a trustee. If the debtor files a chapter 11 petition, the debtor becomes a "debtorin-possession" unless a trustee is appointed. Id. § 1101 (1).
" A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which "profits" to investors are
not created by the success of the underlying business venture, but instead are derived
fraudulently from the capital contributions of other investors. Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R.
Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 48 F.3d 470, 471 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995).
"
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purposes .... Put differently, the defense of in pari 1delicto
loses its
4
sting when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated.
The equities in bankruptcy are no different. The creation of the
estate and appointment of a trustee transforms the zombie, to
whom the unlawful acts of its agents were attributable, into a debtor
entitled to compensation for the benefit of its innocent creditors for
damage previously done to it. The frustration of the judges,
believing § 541 prohibits achieving this appropriate result, is
palpable. In the words of the Tenth Circuit, for example:
Though the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Scholes enjoys a certain
appeal, both from doctrinal and public policy perspectives, we cannot
adopt it in this case. Put most simply, (the bankruptcy trustee is]
acting under 11 U.S.C. § 541, and bankruptcy law, apparently unlike
the law of receivership, expressly prohibits the result [the trustee]
15
urges.

II.

THE RECENT CASES

Thus far, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit Courts
have ruled on this issue, all arriving at the same erroneous
conclusion: If the debtor, prior to bankruptcy, would have been
prohibited by the doctrine of in pari delicto from seeking a remedy
for injuries caused by third parties in cooperation with its managers,
§ 541 requires the bankrupt debtor be so prohibited as well.
A.

The Journey of the Second Circuit

The cases in which trustees were denied the power to assert
claims of a corporate debtor against third parties due to the prebankruptcy conduct of the debtor's principals began to appear in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the early 1990s. Over time,
the theory upon which this power was denied evolved from one
which disregarded the existence of the corporate entity to one that
wholly respected it.

" 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995).
" Sender v. Buchanan (In reHedged-Invs. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996).

HeinOnline -- 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 522 2004-2005

2005]

Ending the Nonsense

The first case, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner,6 makes
no mention of the in pari delicto defense. In Wagoner, the HMK
Management Corporation ("HMK"), through Kirschner, its sole
stockholder, director, and president, moved into the offices and
used the equipment of the Shearson Lehman brokerage firm."
HMK borrowed money from Kirschner's fellow Jehovah's Witnesses,
issuing HMK notes and loan agreements. 8 It then used those funds
to trade in volume in violation of Connecticut law.'9 In less than a
year, HMK began to incur losses.20 Shearson terminated Kirchner's
brokerage accounts and his use of its offices, and eventually HMK
filed for bankruptcy.' The note holders sued Shearson in federal
court, and three years later, the bankruptcy trustee for the Estate of
HMK, Walter Wagoner, Jr., also went after Shearson, demanding
Wagoner sought to arbitrate Shearson's liability for
arbitration.
two types of claims. First, knowing the trading in the HMK accounts
was unsuitable for HMK, Shearson allegedly manipulated Kirschner
into excessively speculative trading-thereby making Kirschner its
implied agent-and allowing him to trade with highly leveraged
funds-hence gaining for itself extraordinarily high commissions.2
This was characterized as a "churning" claim.2

4

Second, Shearson

allegedly engaged in conduct intended to strip HMK of its assetsconduct that in essence "aided, abetted, and unduly influenced
Kirschner in making bad trades that dissipated corporate funds."2 5
This was characterized as a fraud claim.26
Shearson sought an injunction in federal court against
arbitration, which the district court granted on the ground that the
three year statute of limitations had run on these tort claims.27 On
appeal to the Second Circuit, because only the arbitrability of these
16

944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).

" Id. at 116.
is
Id.
19

Id.

2

Id.

V

Id. at 117.

22

Id.

"

Id.

25

Id.

The court characterized this as "a claim against a third party for defrauding the
corporation .... " Id.
17 Id. at 117.

HeinOnline -- 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 523 2004-2005

524

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL

[Vol. 21

28
claims was at issue, the court was unconcerned with their merits.
However, the court viewed the trustee's standing to assert these
29
claims as highly germane to the propriety of arbitration.
Beginning with the premise that the trustee is empowered only to
assert claims of the debtor and not claims of the debtor's creditors,
the court stated: "[W]e review the claims the trustee asserts only to
determine whether a corporation in HMK's position is entitled to
bring such a claim, not whether it has merit."0 Citing numerous
cases in which corporations brought churning claims against
brokerages, the court held the trustee had standing to bring this
one and arbitration of it would be proper. 3'
As to the second claim, however, in which Shearson allegedly
"aided, abetted, and unduly influenced Kirschner in making bad
trades that dissipated corporate funds," the court concluded
Kirschner "not only knew of the bad investments, but actively
forwarded them." 2 Therefore, the court held the corporation and
the trustee would not have standing to bring this claim because a
"claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation with the
cooperation of management accrues to creditors, not to the guilty
corporation.0' The rationale for this rule is "though a class of4
creditors ha[s] suffered harm, the corporation itself ha[s] not."
This ruling has been severely criticized for failing to recognize the

'

See id. at 119.

See id. at 118-20.
s Id. at 119.
1 Id.
"
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120 (citing Fisher, Hecht & Fisher v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. (In reD.H.
Overmyer Telecasting Co.), 56 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); Barnes v. Schatzkin,
215 A.D. 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925)).
m Id. (citing In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 56 B.R. at 661). The court said: "[A]
question remains whether in the case at hand there is any damage to the corporation, apart
from that done to the third-party [creditors or] creditor noteholders." Id. at 118-19. The
court then discussed In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 56 B.R. 657, a case in which third
parties had allegedly helped pack the unsecured creditors' committee with employees and
subordinates, thereby subverting the committee's function. Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120. The
Wagoner court noted that the Overmyercourt held these acts had harmed the creditors and not
the corporation so that the cause of action belonged to the creditors. Id. The Wagoner court
then stated it "believe[d] these cases control the instant issue," relying on Overmeyer for the
proposition that there was no damage to the HMK corporation apart from that done to the
third party creditors. Id. The reliance is hardly well placed. Clearly, the harm to an already
bankrupt corporation in stacking the creditors' committee is a far cry from the harm in
making bad trades that dissipate corporate funds and drive the corporation into bankruptcy.
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injury to the corporation as well as creditors as a basis for standing."5
A finding that the squandering of corporate assets does not harm
the corporation is possible only if one ignores its existence. 6 The
court also misapplied the rule in finding standing to assert the
churning claim but not the fraud claim. Churning requires, at the
very least, the cooperation of corporate principals who are unaware
that they are being churned. In Wagoner, Kirschner did not share
the alleged goal of dissipating corporate funds. 7 In fact, the court
stated he was allegedly unduly influenced in making bad trades.
This is not the type of cooperation in defrauding the corporation to
which the cases cited by the court refer, 9 and the court's distinct
treatment of the two types of claims for standing purposes does not
withstand scrutiny. The conduct of Kirschner in both instances was
Consequently, the Wagoner court both
essentially the same.
encouraged application of a rule that disregards the corporate
entity, and by misapplying it, encouraged its overly simple
application.
In Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co, Colonial Realty and its two
general partners, Googel and Sisti, operated a Ponzi scheme that
led to the bankruptcy of all three, which were consolidated into a
single bankruptcy estate.' ° The trustee sued Arthur Andersen, the
accounting firm, and various others who allegedly participated in
producing the misleading figures that facilitated the scheme.4 '

'5 Ralph Brubaker, Making Sense of the In Pari Delicto Defense: "Who's Zoomin' Who?", 23
BANKR. LAW LETTER No. 11, 1, 3-4 (Nov. 2003).
'6
The fact that once a corporation becomes insolvent the stake holders shift from
shareholders to creditors does not mean the corporation ceases to exist. Frequently the result
is that the corporation, once restructured, continues to operate for the benefit of new owners.
" Surely Kirschner's objective was to make profitable investments for the benefit of
himself and his fellowJehovah's Witnesses, who had trusted him with their money.
Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 119.
'9
In Overmeyer, the defendant law firm had allegedly helped Overmeyer defraud the
corporation by packing the committee with employees, subverting the committee's function.
Id. at 120 (discussing In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.). The Second Circuit's statement that
"Overneyer Telecasting Co. illustrates the point," id., is profoundly incorrect. There is no
suggestion in Wagoner that Kirschner shared in the goal of dissipating corporate funds. The
allegation was that he was unduly influenced. Id. at 119. The Wagoner court also cited Barnes
v. Shatkin, 215 A.D. 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925), a case holding simply that the trustee in
bankruptcy cannot assert the claims of creditors against third parties that were not property of
the estate. Wagoner,994 F.2d at 118.
40 72 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1995).
IId. at 1088.

HeinOnline -- 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 525 2004-2005

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL

[Vol. 21

Applying the Wagoner rule, the Second Circuit held the trustee
lacked standing to assert the claims of the consolidated estate.4 2 In
doing so, the court distinguished the case from Kalb, Voorhis & Co.
v. American Financial Corp.4 In Kalb, the court held the trustee for
the bankrupt corporation had standing to bring a suit against
another corporation, the former controlling shareholder of the
bankrupt debtor, because the debtor was forced to act for the
benefit of the controlling shareholder through domination and
control." Therefore, the trustee was not barred on the ground that
the debtor was in pari delicto with the defendant. 5 In contrast, in
Hirsch, despite allegations that Arthur Andersen "knew everything,"
domination and control by Andersen was not meaningfully alleged
in the complaint.4 Lacking allegations of domination and control,
the court held the third parties could not be sued.47 Recognizing
there was "at least a theoretical possibility of some independent
financial injury to the [diebtors" as a result of the defendant's
professional malpractice, the court nevertheless applied the Wagoner
rule.4s The court appears to have relied on the idea that any
damage suffered by the debtors was passed on to the investors, and
"there [was] likely to be little significant injury that accrues separately
to the Debtors...."4 9
By recognizing, but minimizing, the
likelihood of separate injury to the debtor, the court took a small
step away from the Wagoner premise that there is no such injury.
In Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), Manney had
been the sole shareholder of Mediators, Inc., a corporation in "the
business of acquiring radio and television advertising time for its
clients in exchange for the clients' products and services rather than
for cash." ' O Over time, the corporation amassed a large art
collection, and when severe financial problems arose, Manney set
about buying the collection from the corporation for the bargain
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1094-95 (citing Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.
1993)).

46

47

a
'5

Id. at 1095 (citing Kalb, Voorhis & Co., 8 F.3d at 133).
Kalb, Voorhis & Co., 8 F.3d at 133-34.
72 F.3d at 1095.
Id. at 1094-96.
See id. at 1094.
Id. (emphasis added).
105 F.3d 822, 824 (2d Cir. 1997).
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price of $12.6 million to protect the collection from the
corporation's expected bankruptcy. 1 Manney was assisted in this
effort by Citibank and its lawyers, the "Astor defendants."5 2 Three
years later, an involuntary bankruptcy ensued, and the initial
chapter 7 was soon converted to chapter

11.5 3

When Manney, as

debtor-in-possession, did not proceed against himself, the
Committee for Unsecured Creditors was appointed to represent the
estate, whose assets had been stripped.54 In addition to suing
Manney in bankruptcy court, the Committee also sued Citibank and
the Astor defendants for aiding and abetting the Manneys in
breaching their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
creditors. 5 The court, relying on Wagoner, held that even though
the corporation, and thus the trustee, can sue its principals for
breach of fiduciary duties, where third parties aid and abet a
fiduciary's breach of duty to the corporation, the creditors can sue
in their own right, and the trustee lacks standing to do so.5
One should recall the Wagoner court reasoned that in such
57
instances, the creditors are harmed but the corporation is not.

This leads to the absurd result that when management and its
accomplices defraud a corporation, management can be sued on
behalf of the corporation for the harm caused to the corporation,
but the accomplices cannot be sued on behalf of the corporation
because the corporation was not harmed-only the creditors were
harmed. The irony of this curious reasoning is magnified because
in this case, the claim by creditors in their own right was time-barred
under New York law, 5 leaving the alleged accomplices to skate
free. 59
51 Id. at 825.
52

Id.

53 Id. at 824-25.

Id. at 825.
Id.

Id. at 827.
See supranote 34 and accompanying text.
In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.2d at 825.
Mediators illustrates an additional difficulty that arises when corporate existence is
ignored: Some corporations are harder to ignore than others. Unlike closely held, highly
controlled corporations whose separate existence might be questioned, Mediators, Inc.,
appeared to have a very real existence with substantial assets and enormous debt. See id.
Wang Labs had just obtained a $17 million judgment against the corporation. Id. There was
no such judgment against Manney. Id. It is one thing to disregard the existence of a shell-like
57
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The Second Circuit transition from the lack-of-standing theory
to the in pari delicto theory began with Breeden v. Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP (In re Bennett Funding Group).60 In that case, the
Bennett family, through the Bennett Funding Group ("BFG"),
fraudulently sold and resold office equipment leases to investors.!
Once BFG was bankrupt, the trustee brought actions against an
accounting firm and a law firm for failing to blow the whistle.62 The
court denied standing, relying on Wagoner for the proposition that
"the trustee can sue only if it can establish that there has been
damage to the corporation apart from the damage to third-party
creditors."" Relying on Hirsch, the court stated: "Even if there is
damage to the corporation itself, the trustee cannot recover if the
malfeasor was the corporation's sole shareholder and decision
maker."' The court then completed the dubious logic circle by
saying even if independent financial injury might be established, the
Wagoner rule precluded standing because of the debtor's
collaboration with the third parties.65 Of course the Wagoner rule is
that standing is precluded because there is no independent harm to
66
the corporation.
Perhaps recognizing the illogic of these statements, the court
went on to pursue a different theory, stating the unmentioned
"rationale for Wagoner is that the misconduct of managers within the
scope of their employment will normally be imputed to the
corporation. 6 7 Finding the owners of the corporation had fully
acquiesced in and ratified the managerial acts of their son Patrick,
those acts were imputed to the corporation and the trustee's
standing to sue the third parties denied.6 Without using the phrase,
this ushered in the in pari delicto approach. One should appreciate
corporation of the HMK type. Ignoring the existence of a corporation like Mediators is
another.
336 F.3d 94 (2d Cir 2003).
6!

Id. at 97.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 100 (citing Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 994 F.2d 114, 118-19 (2d
Cir. 1991)); see supra note 34.
In re Bennett Funding Group, 336 F.3d at 100 (citing Hirsh v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 72
F.3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir. 1995)) (parenthetical omitted).
See id.

See Wagoner,944 F.2d at 120.
67 Id. (citing Wight v. BankAmerica Corp. 219 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2000)).
SId.
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the unarticulated theoretical shift at this point: Because the in pari
delicto doctrine's availability turns on the intention of the actors to
benefit the corporation, the doctrine wholly regards rather than
disregards the corporation's existence.
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile v. Coopers &
Lybrand, LLP completed the Second Circuit's shift in approach. 69 In
Color Tile, Color Tile, a Texas retailer of floor coverings, was a
portfolio company of Investcorp Group." "[T]o make Color Tile a
more attractive candidate for an initial public offering," Investcorp,
with the participation of the Coopers & Lybrand accounting firm,
caused Color Tile to purchase American Blind Factory ("ABF"), a
family owned company that sold blinds and wallpaper, at a price
that was too high and on terms too severe.7 1 When Color Tile
defaulted on a $10.4 million interest payment, it filed for relief
under chapter 11.7' As part of a global settlement with its creditors,
an assignment was made to the Color Tile Committee in order to
pursue various claims on behalf of the estate. 3 In federal district
court in New York, the Committee sued Coopers for breach both of
contract and its fiduciary duties in failing to inform the board of
directors the purchase was detrimental to the interests of Color Tile
and "created a grave risk" of inability to meet "its obligations as they
came due . . . . , The Committee sued Investcorp Group for
violating the duty of loyalty by forcing Color Tile to buy ABF on
unreasonable terms for the benefit of the Investcorp Group
defendants and directors. 75 Applying Texas law, the district court
dismissed the case against Coopers because the decision to purchase
ABF was allegedly made by the Color Tile board of directors and its
sole shareholder knowing it was based on grossly inflated and
exaggerated projections; an affirmative in pari delicto defense was
alleged in the complaint.7 6
The Second Circuit affirmed the findings that the allegations in
the pleadings established that Color Tile's board and shareholders
322 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2003).
7

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.

72

Id.

"

Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 154.

"

Id.

76 Id. at 155.
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were at least equally at fault as was Coopers.7 7 The Committee had
argued for application of the adverse interest exception.7 s That is,
because Investcorp Group's interests were allegedly adverse to Color
Tile's, the actions of the corporate agents should not be imputed to
79
the corporation because such adverse actions destroy the agency.
The exception was not applied, however, under the "sole actor"
rule, which negates the exception when the principal and agent are
one and the same. s° The agent's knowledge is imputed to the
principal despite the agent's self-dealing because the party that
should have been informed was the agent itself in its capacity as
principal."' Thus, because the in pari delicto defense would have
under state law, it was effective against the
been effective
• 82
Committee.
The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit Courts' Cases

B.

The Tenth Circuit decided Sender v. Buchanan (In re HedgedInvestments Associates) in 1996.5 Before his imprisonment, James
Donahue operated a long-running Ponzi scheme, selling limited
partnership interests through a solely-owned corporation and three
When the scheme collapsed, Sender was
limited partnerships.
appointed trustee of the bankrupt entities. 5 Sender went after Ms.
Buchanan, one of the few investors to profit from the scheme,

Id. at 164.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166 (citing In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Id. Despite a dearth of Texas authority to support the trial court's ruling, the
Committee's various tactical dilemmas caused it to waive its argument that the district court's
formulation of Texas's in pari delicto defense was incorrect. Id. Declining to endorse the
district court's analysis, the court essentially applied "general" state law. Id. at 163-66.
Of interest was the unresolved possibility that the in pai delicto defense might not be
available against certain types of claims in which existing doctrine takes into account the
effect of the prior conduct of the plaintiff, such as contract actions, and negligence or
malpractice actions in which the defense would be incompatible with concepts of
proportionate responsibility. Id. at 158-60. Part IV of this Article discusses the proper
treatment of the plaintiff's prior conduct in cases in which the in pani delicto defense is
disregarded.
84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996).
"

Id. at 1283.
SId. at 1285.
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taking out $2 million after investing $750,000.6 Sender sought to
enforce her partnership agreement, claiming her profit violated the
agreement. 87 The district court rejected the theory, stating
enforcement of the partnership agreement would serve to further
the illegitimate scheme.88 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sender
argued, based on Judge Posner's evil zombie language in Scholes v.
Lehman,89 that sound policy supported his position in that he was
trying to rectify the fraud, not perpetuate it.9° Despite the
attractiveness of the argument, the court reluctantly rejected it
because § 541 "expressly prohibits" the result Sender urged.9'
In the Sixth Circuit case, Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Securities),
Dublin Securities had devised and carried out fraudulent initial
public stock offerings represented by two law firms and four
lawyers.92 The principals were convicted and the company filed a
chapter 7 petition. 93 Terlecky was appointed trustee and sued the
lawyers and law firms in tort.94 The defendants' motions to dismiss

were granted by the district court on the ground that the claims
were barred under the in pari delicto doctrine. 95 The court of appeals
affirmed, concluding that because the corporation was at least as
culpable as the defendants, the in pari delicto defense applied. 96
In the Third Circuit case, Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
v. RF. Lafferty & Co., the Shapiros operated a Ponzi scheme through
a network of businesses, causing their corporations to issue
fraudulent debt certificates, which were then sold to individual
investors.979 8 Lafferty was one of the outsiders that was allegedly
"essential."
When the scheme collapsed, the companies filed
chapter 11 petitions. 9 A trustee was appointed, and the creditors'
M Id. at 1283.
87

Id.

Id.
56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995); see supra text accompanying note 14.
84 F.3d at 1284.
91 Id. at 1285.
133 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1997).
9'

Id.

'*

Id.

's

Id.

Id. at 380.
267 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 345.
Id.
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committee was authorized to litigate on behalf of the debtors'
estates.'0° Lafferty was one of the defendants sued by the committee,
which asserted numerous common law claims in addition to
violations of federal securities laws.'0' The district court dismissed
the claims against the third parties, reasoning the doctrine of in pani
delicto barred1 02the committee from suing them for claims arising out
of the fraud.

On appeal, the Third Circuit first determined the committee
had standing to sue on behalf of the debtor for the tort of
"deepening insolvency.",0 3 Recognizing that conduct that drives a
corporation deeper into debt injures not only the corporate
creditors, but the corporation itself, the court held the committee
had standing to sue the outsiders on behalf of the debtor. °4
Turning to Lafferty's in pai delicto defense, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the committee's case against Lafferty.'00 The court
noted the Tenth, Sixth, and Second Circuits had "applied the in pari
delicto doctrine to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee, standing in the
shoes of a debtor, against third-parties, without regard to the
trustee's status as an innocent successor," and no courts had held
otherwise. 0 6 The court followed the now familiar analytical path,
beginning with the conclusion that § 541 limits the estate to the
rights the debtor actually held at the moment bankruptcy was
filed. 0 7 The court acknowledged that several courts have declined
to apply the in pari delicto doctrine in the receivership context, but
distinguished them easily, saying, "unlike bankruptcy trustees,
receivers are not subject to the limits of section 541."'08 Having
determined § 541 does not allow for consideration of post-filing
events, such as the removal of the Shapiros, the court applied a
three-step state law imputation analysis: (1) The acts of an officer of
a corporation (here, the Shapiros) are imputed to the corporation
when the officer commits fraud in the course of employment and
10o

Id.

,01 Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 344.
,03 Id. at 349.
IN Id. at 354.
IN Id. at 359.
'
Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
107 See id. at 357.
IN' Id. at 358.
'0
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for the benefit of the corporation; (2) the acts are not imputed if, as
here, the acts of the officer (such as conspiring to deepen the
insolvency of the corporation) are adverse to it and not for its
benefit (the adverse interest exception); and (3) the exception does
not apply where the sole representatives cooperated in the fraud
with the persons who dominated the debtor corporations (the sole
actor exception to the exception)." ° Because the Shapiros totally
dominated their corporations, Lafferty escaped unscathed, free of
responsibility for its alleged role in perpetrating the fraud on
investors."t
In a strong dissent, Judge Cowen criticized the majority for a
result that "needlessly thwarts recovery for innocent creditors, and
insulates from civil liability those who help perpetrate fraud.""' He
argued that once the Shapiros were removed, the doctrine, which is
"readily adapted to achieve equitable results," need not have been
applied, and that restricting the trustee to the debtor's causes of
action and subjecting the trustee to the same defenses assertable
against the debtor does not mandate that postpetition events never
be considered."'
C. Summary Comment on the Circuit Courts' Cases
The cases in these four circuits establish, without variation, that
by including in the bankruptcy estate property of the debtor "as of
the commencement of the case," § 541 demands an inquiry into
what the state-law rights of the debtor would have been on the date
of bankruptcy. If the conduct of the debtor, or that of its agents,
would give rise to the in pari delicto defense, that defense is assertable
against the trustee or debtor in possession regardless of the extent
to which this result undermines bankruptcy policy. In the next Part
of this Article, I argue that § 541 makes no such demand and that
1WId. at 358-59.
11 Id.at 360.
it Id.

Id. at 362-63. Judge Cowen argued that in Segal v. Rochelle a loss-carryback tax refund
was property of the estate because it was rooted in the prebankruptcy past, even though it
could not have been claimed until the end of the tax year, which occurred after the petition
had been filed. 382 U.S. 375,380 (1966). As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 116-38,
it is significant that the issue before the Segal court was whether the refund was property of the
estate, and not what the rights of the debtor might have been under non-bankruptcy law at
the moment of filing.
"
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courts are well empowered to arrive at results consonant with
bankruptcy goals.
III. THE PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
When a bankruptcy case is commenced, the trustee or debtorin-possession must gather up the property of the estate and be
responsible for its use or disposition in the bankruptcy case." 3 If
someone has caused legally cognizable harm to the debtor prior to
the filing, the debtor will have a cause of action against that person,
which the trustee will assert. The defendant will, as in any legal
dispute, seek to minimize liability in any number of ways, such as
denying that a claim exists by attacking the basis of the claim, by
raising any legal or equitable defenses that may be available,
asserting counterclaims, claims for recoupment, and the like. The
effect in bankruptcy of these mitigating strategies will depend on
their nature. But the first question posed, though not often
confronted directly, must be precisely what is and what is not
property of the estate. Quite clearly, the trustee can gather up only
the debtor's interests." 4 In this context, to ask, "What is the
property of the estate?" is to ask, "To what extent do the mitigating
strategies of the defendant affect the debtor's property interests?"
The key to the proper analysis here is to recognize that the
question of what is the property of the estate is a question of federal
law. The question is not simply how much the debtor would get if
the case were tried outside of bankruptcy. This is where the Second,
Third, Sixth and Tenth Circuits went awry. Those courts felt bound
by the phrase "as of the commencement of the case" to decide how
the lawsuit would have come out under state law had bankruptcy not
been filed. But § 541 requires something else: It requires an
identification of debtor's property as a matter of bankruptcy law.
The phrase "as of the commencement of the case"" 5 simply

identifies the moment at which one does so. Of course the rights of
the parties under nonbankruptcy law must be taken into account in

'
Seell U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 1106 (2000).
11 Under § 541 (a) (1), the estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property .... "
11 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1).
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making this determination, but the proper inquiry is decidedly
different from that to which these courts have felt bound.
A. Property of the Bankruptcy Estate Is a Matter ofFederalLaw
Because the bankruptcy system functions within the federal
The
system, reference to nonbankruptcy law is inescapable.
existence and nature of the debtor's rights and interests in property
are determined by nonbankruptcy law, usually state law. Beyond
this necessary reliance on nonbankruptcy law, § 70 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Bankruptcy Act")1 1 6 added an
Most
additional layer of reliance on nonbankruptcy law.
importantly, the property of the estate included all property which,
prior to the filing, the debtor could have "transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him .... 117 This required an inquiry into state limitations on both
transferability and creditor process.
Confronted with these limitations, the United States Supreme
Court concluded in 1903 that state law rights at the moment of
bankruptcy were not the sole determinant of what is property of the
estate. In Page v. Edmunds, the debtor, a long-time member of the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, had filed bankruptcy and failed to list
his membership as an asset because he did not consider it to be
one."" The trustee petitioned for an order to sell it. Memberships
on the exchange were limited in number and conferred only on
persons who were elected by existing members after a complex
recommendation and voting process. " 9 Sale was possible only if all
debts to members were paid. 2 ' Because of these limitations, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had twice held a seat on Sthe
121
exchange was not property and could not be seized in execution.
The United States Supreme Court held that despite the limitations
and restrictions on membership, and despite the rulings of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the membership was property. 22 The
"'
11

Hs
H
121

in

Ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 550 (1898).
Id. § 70(a) (5).
187 U.S. 596,597 (1903).
Id. at 597-98.
I' at 598.
Id.
Pancoast v. Gowen, 93 Pa. 66 (1879); Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55 (1879).
Paige, 187 U.S. 596.
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Court stated the issue had virtually been ruled upon previously in
Hyde v. Woods, in which the Court held that despite such limitations
2
in a bankruptcy case, a seat on a board of exchange was property. 3
Affirming that the issue is one of federal law, the Court stated the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "expresses no rule with
which we need to take issue or which is relevant to the pending
controversy. Nor indeed if the case may be construed
more broadly.
1 24
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has made its own rule."

In Segal v. Rochelle, the United States Supreme Court again
made clear that what is property of the estate is a federal question
under § 70(a) (5) .125 At issue was whether a loss-carryback tax refund
arising out of losses immediately prior to bankruptcy, but not to be
collected until the end of the calendar year, was property of the
estate.21 6 The Court stated that in determining the question of what
2 7
is property, it must be guided by the policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
The loss-carryback tax refund was little entangled with the
bankrupt's ability to make a fresh start, an important bankruptcy
goal.
In contrast, the Court said even though future wages or
expected bequests might be transferable under nonbankruptcy law,
they would nonetheless not be called property within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act because this would defeat the fresh start
policy embodied in the bankruptcy discharge. 9
Cases subsequent to Segal continued to look to bankruptcy
policy as a matter of federal law in resolving questions as to what is
property of the estate. In Lines v. Frederick, the Supreme Court
determined whether earned but unpaid vacation pay was property
of the estate.'
The Court emphasized that "the problem of
classification for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act could not be
resolved simply by reference to the time when the right to the
payment 'vested,' or to definitions of property drawn from other

I

Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
Id.
In
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
I Id. at 376-77.
'
"Whether an item is classed as 'property' by the Fifth Amendment Just-Compensation
Clause or for purposes of a state taxing statute cannot decide hard cases under the
Bankruptcy Act, whose own purposes must ultimately govern." Id. at 379.
124

In

Id.

Id. at 379-80.
400 U.S. 18 (1970).
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areas of the law."1 1 Unlike the bankrupt in Segal, whose business
had ceased to operate, the debtors in Lines were wage earners. In
order to facilitate the bankruptcy policy of the fresh start, the Court
held the accrued pay was not property of the estate. 112 In Kokoscka v.
Belford, the question was whether a debtor's income tax refund was
property of the estate. 3
Again, the Court emphasized, "[i]n
determining the term's scope-and its limitations-the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act 'must ultimately govern."

134

Finding, as in Segal

that the refund was sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past,
and not, as in Lines a surrogate for future wages, the Court held the
refund to be property of the estate.3 5 Nowhere in the opinion is
there any reference to definitions of property drawn from other law.
While no explicit statement exists either in the Code or its
legislative history, it seems without question that the determination
of what is property of the estate remains a matter of federal law to
be resolved in light of bankruptcy policy. The first indication of this
is that the § 541 definition of property of the estate, and the policy it
entails, departs even farther from state law than did the Bankruptcy
Act. Reliance on state transferability, susceptibility to creditor
process, and vesting of title were scrapped, eliminating "any
unnecessary, avoidable dependence on nonbankruptcy law." 3 6 The
"' and the only case
legislative history refers deferentially to Segal,37
under the Code to speak to the issue holds:
While the interest of a debtor in property is determined by State law,
the question whether such property is property of the debtor's estate

is a federal question to be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code ....
It seems clear, at the very least, the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction
to resolve the competing claims to the property in question by

131
132

Id. at 19-20.
Id. While the logic of the majority's holding can be criticized, as in Justice Harlan's

dissent characterizing the holding as giving the debtor a partial head start, id. at 21-22
(Harlan, J., dissenting), there is no question as to whether the telling inquiry is into federal
policy.
417 U.S. 642 (1974).
Id. at 645 (quoting Segal, 382 U.S. at 379).
Id. at 651-52.
5 COLLIER ONBANKRUPTCY 541.LH[3] [a] (15th rev. ed. 2004).
137
"IT]he result of Segal is followed, and the right to a refund is property of the estate."
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), H.R. REP. No. 95-595. at 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323 (citations omitted).
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scrutinizing the respective legal and equitable interests and decide
whether the debtors' interest is such that it is property of the estate
within the meaning of Section 541 of the Code.
Freed from the belief that state law determines what is property of
the bankruptcy estate, courts are then empowered to view the in pari
delicto defense in light of its effect on federal bankruptcy policy.
B.

Implications of the LegislativeHistory

One perceived constraint on the courts' flexibility here is
derived from a misreading of the legislative history. A number of
courts have quoted the following language,3 9 which appeared in
both the Senate and House Reports:
Though [§ 541] will include choses in action and claims by the
debtor against others, it is not intended to expand the debtor's rights
against others more than they exist at the commencement of the
case. For example, if the debtor has a claim that is barred at the time
of the commencement of the case by the statute of limitations, then
the trustee would not be able to pursue that claim, because he too
would be barred. He could take no greater rights than the debtor
himself had.' 4
In isolation, the above language, though unexplained, is quite
directive. However, elsewhere in the legislative history, a different
picture is presented. In describing the final amendments that
conformed the House and Senate bills to one another,
Congressman Edwards stated:
[A] s section 541 (a) (1) clearly states, the estate is comprised of all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case. To the extent such an interest is limited
in the hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of the
estate except to the extent that defenses which are personal against the debtor

,m In re Missouri, 7 B.R. 974, 980 (D. Ark. 1980), affd 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001).
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323.
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are not effective againstthe estate.

It is this second statement upon which Collier, the highly respected
authority on bankruptcy law, relies in describing the reach of
paragraph (1) of § 541.4
Neither of these broad general statements in the legislative
history is explained, yet the seemingly absolute limit in the first
statement on the trustee's power to assert a claim is clearly
contradicted by the mitigating language emphasized in the second
statement. Taken together, the meaning of these unexplained
contradictory statements is indeterminate. At most, they can only
mean that many or even most defenses, such as a statute of
limitations bar, will limit the trustee's power to assert a
prebankruptcy claim, but that some defenses, including those
personal against the debtor, are not effective against the estate. By
ignoring the second and more recent statement in the legislative
history, courts have found the legislative history to be more
restrictive than need be. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say
that courts have found the legislative history to provide greater
support for their reliance solely on state law than it truly does.
C.

Implicationsof FederalSecurities and Antitrust Law

In the parallel universes of securities and antitrust law, realms
in which federal law takes a strong position in regulating business
conduct, the in pai delicto defense has been relegated to the back
seat when in conflict with federal policy. In the case of Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, the in pani delicto defense was
raised against an investor (a tippee) who sued insiders for damages
Both plaintiff and
flowing from fraudulent disclosures. 143
defendants had allegedly violated federal securities law. The United
States Supreme Court relied heavily on an antitrust case, Perma Life
,41 124 CONG. REc. HIl,

1096 (daily ed. Sept 28, 1978) (emphasis added). This
statement by Congressman Edwards immediately followed a description of § 541 (d), which
states that where the debtor held only bare legal title without any equitable interest, the estate
acquires only bare legal title. Id. That is, the defense that the debtor held only bare legal title
Congressman Edwards' subsequent reference
would be assertable against the trustee.
explicitly to subsection (a) (1) is much more general, referring not only to the kinds of
defenses that are assertable against the trustee, but also to the kinds that are not.
142 15 COLLIER, supra note 136,
541.04.
143 472 U.S. 299, 301
(1985).
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Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp., in which the Court had
refused to allow the in pari delicto defense and emphasized "the
inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief
where a private suit serves important public purposes,"" 4 and held
"the doctrine of in pai delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and
4 5
effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action."
Resolving a split among the lower courts in securities cases, the
Court stated:
We therefore conclude that the views expressed in Perma Life apply
with full force to implied causes of action under the federal securities
laws.
Accordingly, a private action for damages in these
circumstances may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff's own
culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the
plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the
violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not
significantly interfere with the effective enforcement
of the securities
146
laws and protection of the investing public.
The Court's requirement that the plaintiff bear at least substantially
equal responsibility is a direct reference to the reality that despite
the implication in the phrase pai delicto of an equal fault
requirement, "many courts have given the.., defense a broad
application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved
generally in 'the same sort of wrongdoing' as defendants." 47 This
loose moralistic approach is clearly rejected.
But even if the
plaintiff's actions were predominant, the defense would still not lie
if permitting it would interfere with federal policies. The Court
added "that denying the in pai delicto defense in such circumstances
will best promote the primary objective of the federal securities
laws-protection of the investing public and the national economy

1" 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
"

Id. at 140.

Berner, 472 U.S. at 310-11; see Miller v. Interfirst Bank of Dallas, N.A., 608 F. Supp. 169,
171 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (summarizing the Fifth Circuit cases thusly: "(1) the fault of the parties
must be clearly mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal; (2) the plaintiff must be an active,
essential, and knowing participant in the illegal activity; and (3) the effect on the investing
public or on the regulatory scheme, caused by permitting the defense must be so slight that it
does not interfere with the objectives of the securities laws").
147 Berner, 472 U.S. at 307 (quoting PermaLife Mufflers, Inc., 392 U.S.
at 138).
"

HeinOnline -- 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 540 2004-2005

2005]

Ending the Nonsense

of business ethics... in
through the promotion of 'a high standard
48

every facet of the securities industry."1

Of course, in antitrust and securities law cases, courts are not
restrained by provisions analogous to § 541. However, once courts
are freed from the belief that identification of § 541 property
requires fealty to state law, these principles should not be difficult to
translate into the bankruptcy realm. Surely bankruptcy law should
also promote a high standard of business ethics in every facet of
business affecting the lending and investing communities.
D. FurtheringBankruptcy Policy by Disregardingthe In Pari Delicto
Defense
The recent cases discussed here are corporate liquidations.
Thus, unlike Segal, Lines, and Kokosczka, the fresh start policy is not
implicated, although if an injured corporation were left with
sufficient assets to seek reorganization, the fresh start policy could
be implicated. In these cases, the fundamental bankruptcy policy to
be furthered is that of fair treatment of creditors and investors by
maximizing the distribution to them of the remains of the debtor.
The distribution is maximized by giving the trustee not only the
149
duty to collect and reduce to money the property of the estate,' but

by providing the trustee broad investigative 5 and avoidance
powers.151 People who have enriched themselves to the detriment of
the estate are called to account for their improper gains. 5 2 Some
are called to account even if they have acted in good faith. 53
Certainly, the policy of fair treatment of creditors and investors
requires that persons who have enriched themselves through breach
of a legal duty to the debtor must be held liable in bankruptcy for
the harm they have caused.
Recall that in the antitrust and securities arenas, the Supreme
Court has refused to permit the in paridelicto defense to operate as a
1.

Id. at 315 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87

(1963)).
149

11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (2000).

150

Id.§ 704(4).

Id. §§ 542-553.
15 Id. § 550 (a).
153 Section 550(b) and (e) provides only limited protection to good faith transferees. Id.
§ 550 (b), (e).
"'
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barrier to relief where a private suit serves important public
purposes. 54 By comparison, the policy mandate in bankruptcy cases
is even more forceful because proceeds of the cause of action will
go, not to the private litigant who was personally in cahoots with the
defendant, but to the innocent creditors and investors. Two
important federal policies are furthered: fair treatment to creditors
and investors and the promotion of a high standard of business
ethics among the professionals who serve and participate in the
affairs of corporate managers.
E.

The Views of Other Commentators

I am not the first to discuss recent treatment of the in pari delicto
defense in bankruptcy. All commentators have been highly critical
of the result in these cases, s5 but only one has commented at length.
Tanvir Alam has published a fine piece entitled, FraudulentAdvisors
Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari Delicto Has Been
1 56
Perverted to Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors.
In his article, he
has much of value to say. It is his view of precisely how the circuit
courts have misapplied § 541 and the consequence of that
misapplication with which I differ. His premise is that bankruptcy
law should not overrule state law when it comes to establishing
property rights. 5 7 For this proposition, he quotes a passage from
Butner v. United States- "Property interests are created and defined
by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding."058 However, by ignoring the emphasized phrase, 59 he
I'

See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jordan A. Kroop, A Ponzi Scheme and a "PointlessTechnicality," 21 AM. BANKR.
INST.J. 26 (2002); Brubaker, supranote 35.
5
77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (2003).
157 Id. at 322.
Id. at 323 n.118 (quoting 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) (emphasis added).
"
Ignoring the phrase, "[ulnless some federal interest requires a different result,"
reflects a critical misunderstanding of Butner, which reversed the practice in a minority of
courts that had "rejected state law [but had] not done so because of any congressional
command, or because their approach [served] any identifiable federal interest." Butner, 440
U.S. at 55. In that case, state law varied as to the steps a mortgagee was required to take in
order to obtain a security interest in rents from the mortgaged property. Id. at 56. A minority
of courts had adopted a uniform federal approach because of their perception of the
demands of equity. Id. at 55. Stating that "undefined considerations of equity provide no
5
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remains tied, as have the courts, to state law conceptions of what is
property. He then argues it is the debtor's ability to assert a claim
that determines what is property of the estate and the in pai delicto
defense has a bearing on the strength or weakness of the claim, but
no bearing on ownership of that claim. 6 ° He cites no authority for
this assertion, which, in my view, is quite a stretch under state lawone bankruptcy courts might well be hesitant to take. His second
and stronger argument is that if the wrongdoer is eventually
removed from a position of recovery, even if after bankruptcy is
filed, that development should be taken into account. 61 It makes no
sense, he argues, to analyze the underlying facts frozen in time. 6 '
This argument, however, has been explicitly considered and
rejected by the circuit courts."'
In contrast, my view explicitly recognizes that the question of
what is property for the purposes of § 541 is a matter of federal law
to be determined in light of federal bankruptcy policy. Thus, courts
may follow the well-trod path laid down by Segal, Lines, and Kokoscza
that permits disregard of the in pai delicto defense on the ground
that, as in the antitrust and securities arenas, 16 doing so promotes
federal policy.

basis for adoption of a uniform federal rule affording mortgagees an automatic interest in the
rents as soon as the mortgagor is declared bankrupt," the court rejected this approach. Id. at
56. Variations in property law from state to state are to be respected. For example,
bankruptcy law "recognizes and enforces the laws of the states affecting dower, exemptions,
the validity of mortgages, priorities of payment, and the like." Id. at 54 & n.9 (citing
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613, (1918)). This "serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.'" Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 364
U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). Variations, of themselves, present no federal issue.
" Alam,supranote 156, at 322.
161 Id.
62 Id. at 322-23.
1W See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 356-59 (3d Cir.
2001); In reHedged Invs. Assocs., 84 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996).
lu See supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
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IV. HOW TO APPROACH A CLAIM TO WHICH THE DEFENSE OF IN PAR!
DELICTO IS RAISED

The Effect of the Debtor's Conduct on the Debtor'sProperty

A.

When a person is injured by the unlawful conduct of another,
the law provides a right to a remedy. That right normally takes the
form of a civil cause of action or a number of causes of action. Each
cause of action is the property of the injured party. The conduct of
the debtor before, during, and after the injury can affect the
debtor's rights, creating defenses to the debtor's cause of action.
Depending on its nature, the debtor's conduct may or may not
affect the debtor's property. Some sorts of conduct undermine the
enforceability of the cause itself, while others, such as the in pari
delicto defense, may create only personal barriers to assertion of the
cause. It is my thesis, supported by at least some of the legislative
history16 and the bankruptcy policies discussed above, 166 that the
possible availability of the in pari delicto defense under state law does
not affect the debtor's property for the purposes of § 541 .'6
There are many examples of the first type of conduct, which
undermines an element in the cause of action or a requisite to its
enforceability. If a victim of negligence has been contributorily
negligent, liability will normally be apportioned in accord with the
relative contribution of each negligent act to the causation of the
injury. 16 Causation is, of course, an element in all civil actions, and
10
16

67

See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
There are parallels to this notion in nonbankruptcy property law.

For example,

suppose a tenant on an enforceable lease promises to paint the landlord's portrait, and the
parties expressly agree that "this covenant shall be a covenant running with the land, binding
and benefiting the parties' grantees and assigns forever and ever." ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 471 (West 2d ed. 1993). If the tenant then assigns the leasehold,
the covenant will continue to bind the assignor, but it will not be binding on the new lessee.
Id. Such covenants do not run with the land because, to do so, a covenant must touch and
concern the land. Id. For the same reason, the benefit of the covenant would not be
enforceable by the landlord's grantee. Id. The benefit and burden of the covenant are
personal to the original parties, but despite their intention, it does not affect the property, the
leasehold. Id.
In the instant context, one might say that, being a purely personal limitation, the in pari
delicto defense does not touch and concern the cause of action. Thus its benefits and burdens
do not affect the property, the cause of action.
" The overwhelming majority of American states now follow the comparative
negligence system, either through legislation or by judicial adoption. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw
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if an alleged victim has been a contributing cause, this will normally
either lessen or wholly destroy the claim for compensation. If a
defrauded buyer of goods has personally inspected the goods, to the
extent the buyer has or should have discovered the truth, this will
undermine the requirement that the buyer reasonably rely on the
misrepresentations of the seller. 69 If a party to a contract does not
receive the performance contracted because he or she has
committed a material breach, there will be no case for breach
because the breach will operate as failure of the constructive
condition precedent to the other's duty to perform.'7" If a victim of
a civil wrong waits to assert it until the statutory period of limitations
has run, absent circumstances that might toll the running of the
period, the enforceability of the cause is destroyed. 7' In all of these
examples, the effect of the would-be plaintiffs conduct has been to
limit or eliminate the enforceability of the cause of action itself,
destroying to that extent its value as property. While the mere
availability under state law of the in pari delicto defense should be
irrelevant to whether a cause of action is property of a debtor's
estate, the debtor's conduct should be assessed directly for its
impact, if any, on the cause itself.
In proposing these claims against third parties should be
assertable in bankruptcy, I recognize that issues of judicial economy
Courts regularly point out that the creditors
are presented.
themselves may assert these claims on their own, and courts
sometimes point out that such litigation is pending. 72 The
possibility exists that suit by creditors in state court and suit by the
trustee might be brought simultaneously. The two law suits may be
OF TORTS § 201 (2000). Almost all systems of comparative fault reduce the plaintiff's recovery
in proportion to the plaintiff's relevant fault. Id. The plaintiffs fault is not relevant if it is not
one of the causes in fact of the plaintiffs harm. Id. Nor is it relevant if it is not a proximate
cause. Id.
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1981). If the plaintiff's investigation
reveals the whole truth, the plaintiff does not rely on the misrepresentation. When no
evidence shows what the plaintiff learned from the investigation, courts may conclude she did
not rely on the defendant's misrepresentation, but upon her own investigation. DOBBS, supra
note 168 § 475.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237,238,241,242 (1981).
1
51 AM.JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 3 (2004).
"' E.g., "[A]s the [bankruptcy] court noticed judicially, the defendants here are also
named as defendants in other actions filed by the creditors seeking compensation for the
allegedly fraudulent activity in which the defendants engaged." In re Dublin Secs., 133 F.3d
377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997).
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wholly redundant, or they might entail independent elements, as
where there is a clear injury to the corporation or its shareholders
separate from injury to creditors. Fortunately, because of its broad
jurisdictional authority, the bankruptcy court is the perfect place to
identify and minimize inefficiencies of this sort. The bankruptcy
court can assert jurisdiction over both suits' and decide how best to
proceed. If the creditors are the only parties in interest and they are
well represented, or if the litigation has substantially progressed
prior to the filing of the petition, the court can abstain from
the litigation and abstain from
asserting jurisdiction or bifurcate
74
involvement in a part of it.

Alternatively, representing themselves outside of bankruptcy is
not easy, requiring significant cooperation and cost-sharing among
creditors whose interests are not always coherent.' 75 The creditors
might agree that the trustee or the unsecured creditors' committee
is the better champion. Indeed, in numerous bankruptcy cases, it is
the unsecured creditors' committee that urges assertion of these
claims in bankruptcy court.' 76 Worse yet, contrary to the courts' glib

assertions that the claims against the third parties accrue to the
creditors, it is often far from clear that the creditors will effectively
be able to assert them. Lack of privity will normally defeat contractbased claims. 7 7 Moreover, claims sounding in tort such as in
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and even intentional

1
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) (providing the district court jurisdiction over all civil
proceedings "arising in or related to cases under title 11").
174 Id. § 1334(c) (1).
The district court may abstain from hearing a particular proceeding
arising in or related to a case under title 11 "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of
comity with State courts or respect for State law...." Id. Where an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c) (1) that could not have been brought in federal court has been commenced in state
court, abstention is mandatory if it can be timely adjudicated. Id. § 1334(c) (2).
In See, e.g., Judge Posner's comment on the alternatives to representation by a receiver:
"The conceivable alternatives to these suits for getting the money back into the pockets of its
rightful owners are a series of individual suits by the investors, which, even if successful, would
multiply litigation; a class action, by the investors-and class actions are clumsy devices...."
Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 755 n.14 (7th Cir. 1995).
176 In three of the eight circuit court cases discussed supra, the claim against
third parties
was brought by the Committee. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color
Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2003); Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Mediators, Inc., 105
F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997).
I" See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 112 (N.Y.
1985).
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misrepresentation are often stymied by inability to prove privity,178
causation,'79 or sufficient "linking conduct" between the third party
and the debtor's customers."' As the cases disclose, there are
numerous instances in which dismissal of the claim on in pari delicto
grounds permits third parties to escape responsibility.
The eight recent circuit court cases discussed above illustrate
some of the common settings in which these issues are likely to be
posed. Thus, they provide apt examples of how the prebankruptcy
conduct of the debtor's principals might affect the debtor's claims
against third parties who contributed to the debtor's harm. In three
of the cases, Wagoner, Hirsch, and Lafferty, the third parties allegedly
assisted the debtor in defrauding the lending or investing public. In
three of the cases, Bennett Funding, Color Tile, and Dublin Securities,
the third parties allegedly failed in their professional obligation to
blow the whistle on the principals. In one, Mediators, the third
parties allegedly assisted the principals in looting the corporation,
and in another, Buchanan, the defendant was simply a lucky investor
who managed to withdraw from a Ponzi scheme with a profit. How
would these cases properly have been analyzed under the approach
I advocate in this Article?
Third Parties Who Assist the Debtor's Principalsin Defraudingthe
Public

B.

In Wagoner, Shearson allegedly defrauded Kirschner into
making poor investments with the money loaned to his corporation
by his fellow Jehovah's Witnesses."' By providing him an office, a
video monitor, and by manipulating him onto excessively
speculative trading,"' Shearson facilitated Kirschner's illegal
operations and contributed to the demise of the enterprise. But it
was Kirschner who solicited the loans for the purpose of engaging in
If the allegations were true,
illegally speculative investing. 82
Kirschner probably could not have done so much harm on his own,
17

Id.

In See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 210-217 (2d Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 222 F.3d 63, 75-76 (2d Cir.

2000).
181 Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 994 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1991).
182 Id. at 116-17.
1-3

Id.
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and Shearson's contributory harm to the corporation was
significant. In such a case, joint liability of Shearson and Kirschner
would be proper.
In Hirsch, the Arthur Andersen accounting firm allegedly
participated in producing misleading figures that facilitated the
scheme to defraud investors. 184 The principals were the prime
movers,
of course, but the importance of the approval of a
respected accounting firm like Arthur Andersen cannot be
understated. Investors are far more likely to trust the assertions of
the principals when backed by the support of such a firm. Similarly,
in Lafferty, the Lafferty firm was allegedly an essential participant,
along with the Shapiros, in perpetrating a fraud on public investors
who were induced to invest in fraudulent debt certificates." 6 If the
allegations were true, both the Andersen and Lafferty firms should
have shared in the liability for the harm caused.
In all three of these cases, the joint contributory conduct of the
principals was palpable, perhaps primary, but such conduct would
in no way serve to excuse or relieve the third parties from liability
for their contribution to the harm.
Refinements as to the extent of liability may be in order here.
For example, perhaps Shearson, Arthur Andersen, and Lafferty
should not be liable for all of the injury suffered by the debtors, as
would be the normal result where joint tortfeasors cause indivisible
harm. 8 7 Perhaps some theory of proportionate liability should be
applied, rendering the third party abettors liable in bankruptcy only
for the proportionate injury they caused. The debtor's property in
the form of its cause of action could be limited in that way as a
matter of bankruptcy policy. The conduct of the debtor's managers
would not be ignored; it would detract from the cause of action to
the extent that the managers' conduct operated as a contributing
cause.
Perhaps the attractiveness of the in pari delicto doctrine in cases
such as these is that it avoids the windfall effect of imposing
enormous liability on a participant who has a deep pocket, or who
M Hirsh v. Arthur

Anderson & Co., 72 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1995).
Googel and Sisti, the principals, perpetrated their Ponzi schemes through their
partnership, Colonial. Arthur Anderson performed extensive services by providing forecasts,
analyses, and access to potential investors. Id. at 1088.
'" Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 2001).
117 DOBBS, supranote 168, § 385.
185
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has the only remaining pocket. Apportioned liability would avoid
the sense of excessiveness or inequity in applying the traditional
joint liability rule. ' 8 But the complete escape of guilty third parties
afforded by the in pari delicto doctrine is just as inappropriate as
would be complete responsibility.
C.

Third Parties Who Failto Blow the Whistle

In Bennett Funding, the corporation was used as a vehicle for a
Ponzi scheme.189 The third party accountants allegedly knew of
these illegal activities and failed to inform anyone. 9° At issue was
whether there was anyone around to whom to make the disclosures
because the innocent parties interested in the enterprise were
allegedly powerless to do anything.' 9 ' In Color Tile, the Coopers
accounting firm allegedly knew and failed to disclose to the parties
trusting Coopers for a disinterested appraisal of the deal that the
principals had arranged a purchase of ABF at a price too high and
on terms too severe. 92 The purchase was the undoing of the
corporation. 93 In In re Dublin Securities, for seven years Dublin
Securities devised and carried out over $60 million worth of
fraudulent initial public stock offerings. 94 The principals were
jailed, and the chapter 7 trustee sued the firm's lawyers, alleging
they knew or should have known of the illegal nature of the
'8 The apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors is consistent with state law,
which normally permits an action in contribution among joint tortfeasors in which the joint
obligors are left to achieve the apportionment in a separate action wholly apart from the main
action in which liability is established. See DOBBS, supra note 168, §§ 386-87. But in
bankruptcy, the managers are likely to be insolvent, in jail, or in Timbuktu, so that an action
in contribution would be meaningless. For this reason, depending on circumstances such as
the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct and the depth of its pocket, it may be
appropriate to consider apportioning liability in the bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court,
after all, is often said to be a court of equity. See JOHN D. AYER & MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN,
]
BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE 42 (2002) (stating "[n o principle of bankruptcy jurisdiction is more
familiar... than the notion that the bankruptcy court is a 'court of equity'" and pointing out
a computer search reveals over 350 published opinions so stating).
In reBennett Funding Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2003).
The complaint against the law firms alleged that they submitted a false letter to the
SEC designed to hinder the SEC investigation of the company. Id.
19 Id. at 99.
19
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322
F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
'9' Id.
133 F.3d 377, 378 (6th Cir. 1997).
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95
activities but failed to apprize the business of those illegalities.
Accordingly, the issues were posed in these cases and the trustee
should have been put to the proof: Did the defendants have a duty
to disclose what they knew? To whom should they have made these
disclosures? And what harm might have been avoided if they had
done so?
In these cases, the unlawful conduct of the principals does not
excuse the alleged failures of the professionals. Indeed, it is
precisely that unlawful conduct that gives rise the professionals'
alleged duty to disclose. In these cases, the extent of liability caused
by the alleged breach of duty is simply the extent to which the
defendant could have prevented harm and failed to do so. The role
of management is important to the causation analysis in
determining the extent to which harm might have been avoided if
the duty had not been breached. If management was in a position
to undermine the effect of the required disclosures, this would
mitigate the effect of breach. These can be quirky issues of fact, to
be sure, but issues well worthy of pursuit.

D. Third Parties Who Assist in Looting the Corporation
In Mediators, Citibank and the Astor defendants allegedly aided
and abetted the sole shareholders, the Manneys, in looting the
corporation by buying the corporate art collection at far less than
fair value. 96 The Astor defendants were the lawyers who advised the
Manneys to enter the transaction, which they opined was "legal,
valid and binding," and Citibank loaned the $12 million purchase
price to the Manneys, taking a security interest in the art and a
corporate guarantee, leaving the corporation with liability for the
price and far less cash than the collection was worth. 97 Citibank was
charged with actual or constructive knowledge of both the low price
and the fraudulent nature of the conveyance.' 98 Eventually, the
corporation landed in chapter 11 and the Committee for
Unsecured Creditors sued the Astor Group and Citibank for aiding
and abetting in the looting. '

'
"

Id.
In re Mediators, 190 B.R. 515, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 520.
Id.

Id.
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These causes of action should have been seen as property of the
estate. Surely the Astor defendants' assurance that this fraudulent
transfer was "legal, valid and binding" amounted to malpractice. 200
Furthermore, the Committee should have been permitted to
attempt to prove the allegations that Citibank knew or should have
known that it was facilitating a fraudulent looting of the
corporation. The conduct of management would not provide
Citibank with a complete defense, but would be relevant to the
inquiry into how management so effectively bamboozled Citibank
into believing, if it did, that the transaction was genuine.
The Investor Who Did Not Lose

E.

Perhaps the most intriguing of the eight cases is Buchanan.
Hedged Investments ran a long-running Ponzi scheme in which Ms.
Buchanan and her children became limited partners. °1 As is typical
of Ponzi schemes, early investors get paid from the contributions of
She was fortunate enough to receive
subsequent investors.0 2
payments of $2 million as a result of a $750,000 investment. 22 When
the scheme went under, the trustee in bankruptcy went after Ms.
Buchanan, claiming that her profit violated the partnership
Had the court been willing to disregard the
agreement. 2°4
unlawfulness of the scheme and hear the trustee out, it is unclear
how the case would have come out. Perhaps the trustee would have
succeeded under state law, depending on the terms of the
agreement and state partnership law. Persons who have received
unlawful dividends, even innocently, may properly be seen to have
been unjustly enriched, and thus obligated to disgorge their
improper gains. Sharing her gain with other investors would be
consistent with the bankruptcy policies of treating similarly situated
parties equally. In other instances, such as those of preference and
sometimes fraudulent conveyance avoidance, innocent parties are
forced to disgorge benefits received prior to bankruptcy to be
shared by other claimants. 0 5 Yet, because there is no suggestion that

'0'

Id.
In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 84 F.3d 1281, 1283 (10th Cir. 1996).
See supra note 13.
In re Hedged-Invs. Assoc., 84 F.3d at 1283.
Id.
There is no escape from avoidance of preferential transfers under § 547 based on
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Ms. Buchanan did anything wrong, forcing disgorgement of her
profits would not provide incentive to professionals to conduct
themselves ethically in the securities arena. In that light, perhaps
this is one instance in which there is not a federal interest sufficient
to justify disregard of state property law.
CONCLUSION

In collecting the property of the estate, I have argued the
trustee should be permitted to sue third parties who have, in
cooperation with the debtor's managers, caused harm to the debtor.
In doing so, any defense that might arise from the managers'
conduct under the in pani delicto doctrine should normally be
disregarded in furtherance of federal bankruptcy policy. However,
the debtor's conduct through its managers should not be ignored
If the debtor's conduct through its managers has
entirely.
substantive impact on the debtor's causes of action, such as by
defeating an element in the prima facie case or by creating a
substantive affirmative defense, then those meritorious defenses
should be available against the trustee.
As application of these ideas to the above eight cases suggests,
the conduct of the managers will sometimes, perhaps often, play an
important role in determining the extent of the third party liability
under substantive law. This is as it should be. What is not as it
should be is that third parties who have contributed to the
bankruptcy of the debtor in cooperation with the debtor's managers
wholly escape liability to the estate. Nothing in § 541 demands such
a result.

innocent intent or good faith. Nor are such defenses available to initial transferees under
§ 550(a)(1). Good faith transferees of fraudulently conveyed property receive a lien on the
property to the extent of value given, § 548(c), but they forfeit any value the property may
have in excess of that amount.
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